This paper examines the determinants of intra-firm trade in US imports using detailed country-product data. We create a new measure of product contractibility based on the degree of intermediation in international trade for the product. We find important roles for the interaction of country and product characteristics in determining intra-firm trade shares. Intra-firm trade is high for products with low levels of contractibility sourced from countries with weak governance, for skill-intensive products from skill-scarce countries, and for capital-intensive products from capital-abundant countries.
Introduction
Research on multinational …rms has recently been extended to incorporate elements of contract theory. This literature addresses …rms' decisions to source components inhouse versus at arm's length and their choices over whether to locate production at home or abroad. It di¤ers from earlier work on multinationals in its emphasis on the costs associated with writing contracts for specialized inputs and on the importance of traded intermediate goods.
This paper provides an empirical examination of the determinants of intra-…rm trade.
We use detailed U.S. import data to characterize the product and country attributes that determine …rms' decisions to import from related parties rather than at arm's length.
Theoretical models addressing this issue focus on the ability of the …rm to write contracts for the production of specialized inputs. We introduce a new measure of products'revealed contractibility based on the idea that contracting is easier for products that are traded by intermediaries such as wholesalers.
Forty-six percent of U.S. imports occurred between related parties in 2000. This aggregate statistic, however, obscures considerable variation in intra-…rm intensity across import partners as well as products. Indeed, while 74 percent of U.S. imports from Japan are intra-…rm, the …gure for Bangladesh is just 2 percent. Likewise, trade between related parties accounts for 2 percent of U.S. imports of rubber and plastic footwear, but more than 70 percent of U.S. imports of autos, medical equipment and instruments. There is also signi…cant variation in intra-…rm intensity across countries within products.
These …gures highlight the importance of product and country characteristics -and especially their interaction -in explaining intra-…rm trade. Such factors are emphasized in recent theoretical models of multinational …rms that stress the role of contracting in …rms' decisions both to source components in-house versus at arm's length and to locate production at home versus abroad. 1 These models di¤er from earlier theories of multinationals in their emphasis on the costs associated with writing contracts for specialized inputs and the attention they pay to traded intermediate goods.
Guided by these models, we examine the product and country determinants of intra-…rm trade. Our …ndings are related to the large theoretical literature on international trade and the boundaries of the …rm, including in particular Antràs (2003) , Antràs and Helpman (2004) , and Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005) . Our …ndings are also related to the recent empirical literature examining the predictions of these models, including Corcos et al. (2008) , Defever and Toubal (2007) , Nunn and Tre ‡er (2008) and Yeaple (2006) . More generally, our …ndings are related to the recent literature on institutions and trade,
including Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) .
We …nd that our measure of contractibility and countries'governance quality are associated with variation in intra-…rm trade in interesting and intuitive ways, and that factors associated with engaging in related-party trade di¤er from those associated with the intensity of intra-…rm trade once a link is established. Higher-quality country governance, for example, is associated with a higher probability of related-party trade taking place.
Further increases in quality, however, coincide with lower shares of related-party trade, presumably due to the greater ease with which arm's-length contracts can be written.
With respect to interactions of product and country attributes, improvements in country governance lead to the largest reductions in intra-…rm trade in low contractibility products.
Data
We use the U.S. Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which links individual U.S. trade transactions to U.S. …rms.
2 For each import transaction, we observe the U.S. …rm engaging in the transaction, the ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) classi…cation of the product shipped, the (nominal) value shipped, the shipment date, the source country, and whether the transaction takes place at "arm's length"(AL) or between "related parties" (RP). Import partners are "related" if either party owns, directly or indirectly, 6 percent or more of the other party. 3 To concord SIC production and HS trade data, and to expand the sample of countries on which data on country characteristics are available, we focus on the year 1997. we use this factor as the indicator of governance in our empirical work. We measure products'capital and skill intensity using data from the 1997 U.S. Census of Manufactures. We assign all ten-digit HS products within a particular four-digit SIC industry the average physical capital or skill intensity of all plants whose output is concentrated in that industry. Physical capital intensity is measured as the log of the book value of plant and equipment per employee while skill is non-production workers as a share of employment. Industry headquarters intensity is measured by the average share of …rm employment at headquarters and auxiliary establishments.
Intra-…rm imports
This section documents the extent of U.S. intra-…rm imports by trading partner and industry. To maximize our ability to report results across countries and industries, we use recently published, publicly available data on related-party trade from the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau.
4
The industry data on related-party trade is reported according to the North American Industry Classi…cation System (NAICS) and, as a result, di¤ers from the more detailed Harmonized System codes available in the LFFTD and employed in the subsequent regression analysis.
By Country
We begin by considering variation in related-party imports across countries in 2000.
The data are summarized in Table 1 which reports the level of imports and the share of related-party imports by country. Over 46 percent of U.S. imports are intra-…rm and there is wide range in intensity of intra-…rm trade across countries. For the average country, 23.8 percent of exports to the U.S. are intra-…rm and more than a quarter of countries have intra-…rm shares less than 5 percent. On the low end, imports from Bangladesh are almost entirely arms-length transactions, with just 2 percent of the total value of imports taking place inside the …rm. In contrast, imports from Japan and Ireland are dominated by intra-…rm transactions. In 2000, 76 percent of the value of imports from Ireland and 74 percent of the imports from Japan were conducted by multinationals trading with related foreign divisions. Anecdotal publicly-available evidence would suggest that the intra-…rm imports of Ireland and Japan stem from di¤erent types of organizations.
Japanese intra-…rm shipments to the U.S. are likely trades between Japanese parents and U.S. subsidiaries, while Irish intra-…rm shipments are more likely to be between Irish subsidiaries and U.S. parents, or U.S. a¢ liates of European multinationals.
In general, countries that account for low shares of U.S. intra-…rm imports are less developed and have lower overall import volumes, while high-income countries in the OECD generally report above average intra-…rm imports to the United States. Imports from China, the fourth largest source of U.S. imports in 2000, are still largely conducted between unrelated parties with just 18 percent exchanged inside the …rm.
By Industry
As with the country-level data, industries vary widely in the extent to which their trade takes place within …rms.
5 Imports of leather, textiles and apparel are dominated by arms-length transactions while more than half of imports in transportation equipment, computers and electronics products and chemicals are conducted between related parties. Table 2 reports the manufacturing industries with the 20 highest and 20 lowest shares of related-party trade in 2000 using 6-digit NAICS industries. Footwear industries are heavily represented in the low end of the distribution of intra-…rm trade shares. In rubber and plastic footwear, for example, intra-…rm imports account for just 1.8 percent of total imports. Imports of autos and related equipment, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, and instruments, on the other hand, are dominated by intra-…rm transactions. In each of these industries, more than 70 percent of all imports are between related parties.
These industry averages obscure important variation across countries within products. Figure 1 shows the distribution of imports of Photo Films, Plates and Chemicals (NAICS 325992) across countries. This industry has the …fth highest share of intra-…rm imports.
The …gure shows both the share of intra-…rm imports from each country (line -left axis) and the level of overall imports (bar -log scale right axis). The countries are sorted by the share of intra-…rm imports in total imports in 2000. While the industry as a whole has a high level of intra-…rm trade, there is substantial variation across countries. Half the countries, including most of the major exporters by volume, have intra-…rm shares greater than 70 percent. Most of the remaining countries, including a number of middle income and developing countries, have little or no related-party trade to the U.S.. This pattern of heterogeneous intra-…rm shares across countries within industries is the norm rather than the exception. Figure 2 shows the same picture for imports of Other Footwear (NAICS 316219). 6 This industry has the sixth lowest share of intra-…rm imports but again there is a wide variation in related party shares ranging from 100 percent to zero.
This variation in intra-…rm imports shares within industries across countries motivates our use of both country and product characteristics and their interaction in our subsequent empirical work.
"Revealed Contractibility"
We assume that products passing through intermediaries are the easiest over which to contract. As a result, we measure products'"revealed"contractibility as the weighted average wholesale employment share of …rms importing the product, using …rms'import value as weights,
The …rst term in the intermediation measure is the share of wholesale employment (W f ) in …rm f 's total employment (EM P f ). 7 The second term is the import share of …rm f in ten-digit HS product market p, with M pf and M p representing …rm f 's imports of product p and total U.S. imports of product p, respectively. Intermediation ranges between zero and unity: if no …rms importing product p have any wholesale establishments,
On the other hand, if product p is imported exclusively by …rms with 100 percent employment in wholesaling, IM ED p = 1. Table 3 Intermediation and intra-…rm import shares are inversely related across two-digit HS categories, as shown in Figure 3 . There is however substantial independent variation in the two variables, as industries with similar levels of intermediation span a wide range of intra-…rm intensity. Footwear (HS 64) and Organic Chemicals (HS 29), for example, have comparable levels of intermediation, 0.135 and 0.136 respectively. However, more than half of Organic Chemicals imports are conducted by related parties while the intra-…rm trade share for Footwear is less than 10 percent.
Determinants of intra-…rm trade
Our empirical analysis uses cross-sectional data on intra-…rm and total U.S. imports of product p from county c in 1997. Our empirical speci…cation regresses measures of intra-…rm trade (IF pc ) on product characteristics (X p ), country characteristics (Z c ) and interactions between product and country characteristics (X p Z c ):
We consider two measures of intra-…rm trade: the share of intra-…rm imports in U.S.
imports, which we refer to as the "intensive"margin, and a dummy variable which is equal to one if there are positive intra-…rm imports for a product from a country, which we call the "extensive" margin. In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from each variable entering the interaction term. This normalization ensures that the main e¤ects of each variable can be interpreted as the e¤ect at the sample mean.
Our choice of product and country characteristics is motivated by the recent theoretical literature on contractual frictions and international trade. This literature emphasizes the relative importance of relationship-speci…c investments by headquarters and supplier …rms and the degree of veri…ability of these investments. In Antràs (2003), capital intensity captures the relative importance of headquarters'investments, and hence we include industry capital intensity and country capital abundance. To allow for the possibility that other factor intensities matter, we also include industry skill intensity and country skill abundance. In Antràs and Helpman (2004) , headquarters investments are interpreted more broadly, and hence we include the direct measure of headquarters intensity noted above. In Grossman and Helpman (2005) , the degree of veri…ability of relationship-speci…c investments can vary with product and country characteristics, and hence we include revealed product contractibility and country governance as further independent variables. Finally, we explore the impact of policy-based barriers by including measures of trade and FDI protection as country characteristics. Table 4 reports the results of estimating speci…cation (2). Columns (1) and (3) use the extensive margin as the dependent variable, so the sample comprises all product-country cells with positive imports, including those with zero intra-…rm trade. Columns (2) and (4) focus on the intensive margin, and the sample is all observations with positive intra…rm trade. Columns (3) and (4) control for the non-random selection of observations with positive intra-…rm imports using the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure. The two stages are separately identi…ed by functional form and the excluded variable from the second-stage regression. For the excluded variable, we choose the cost of phone calls to the US, which arguably a¤ects the …xed costs of establishing an a¢ liate but not the relative variable costs of intra-…rm versus arms-length trade. 8 We …nd an important role for revealed contractibility on both the intensive and extensive margins of intra-…rm trade. Consistent with the recent theoretical literature on contractual frictions in international trade, columns (1) and (2) show that higher revealed product contractibility is associated with less intra-…rm trade. The role of the contracting environment varies across the intensive and extensive margins. Increases in governance quality raise the probability that foreign a¢ liates are present (column 1), but are associated with lower shares of intra-…rm trade (column 2). This result suggests good governance promotes the establishment of related-party trade but not its intensity once established, which is consistent with the idea that arm's-length contracting is easier in countries with good governance. This non-linearity in the role of the country contracting environment is not formally developed in existing theoretical models. Similar di¤erences between the intensive and extensive margins are present for population and FDI protection. Table 4 also indicate the signi…cance of interactions of product and country characteristics in determining intra-…rm trade. While the main e¤ects for intermediation and country governance are both negative in column (4), the interaction term has a positive coe¢ cient. That is, improved governance is associated with less intra-…rm trade, especially for goods with lower revealed contractibility.
Results in
In contrast to previous work, we also …nd a role for industry skill intensity and country skill abundance. The main e¤ects of industry skill intensity on intra-…rm trade are positive for both the intensive and extensive margins; the main e¤ects of country human capital abundance are negative; and the estimated coe¢ cients on the skill interaction terms are negative. Therefore, greater industry skill intensity increases the share of intra…rm trade, and leads to larger increases in more skill-scarce countries. In contrast, greater country skill abundance reduces the share of intra-…rm trade, and leads to larger reductions in more skill-intensive products. As in Antràs (2003) , industry capital intensity 9 and country capital abundance play a role in determining the share of intra-…rm trade. The positive coe¢ cient on the interaction between industry capital intensity and country capital abundance implies that intra-…rm trade shares are high for capital-intensive products coming from capital-abundant countries. Both FDI and trade protection in ‡uence intra-…rm trade; headquarters intensity is not statistically signi…cantly associated with intra-…rm trade shares.
In Table 5 , we repeat the OLS speci…cation from column (2) in Table 4 with a complete set of country and product …xed e¤ects to examine the robustness of the results on the interaction terms. The contractibility-governance and human capital interactions retain their sign and signi…cance while the interaction on physical capital is insigni…cant.
Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of the results to alternative speci…cations.
Column 1 of Table 6 repeats the preferred speci…cation from column 4 in Table 4 . In columns 2-4, we drop sectors that contain …rms that do not conform strictly to the existing theoretical models. The literature on multinationals and contracting envisions a producing …rm headquartered in an advanced country importing intermediate goods, potentially from its a¢ liates. Our results in column 1 include all imports, including imports of …nal goods and imports by U.S. a¢ liates of foreign multinationals. Column 2 excludes sectors that are intensive in foreign-owned …rms, column 3 drops …nal goods products and column 4 drops both at once. 9 None of the coe¢ cients change sign or signi…cance and all the main conclusions are robust to these sample changes.
In the …nal three columns of Table 6 , we include additional regressors considered in related empirical work. Column 5 adds a measure of industry R&D intensity, the R&D to sales ratio which is only available for a subset of industries. (2008), but does not a¤ect the revealed contractibility measure or its interaction. The interaction term is negative and signi…cant, which combined with the negative main e¤ect of country governance implies that improvements in country governance are associated with the largest reductions in intra-…rm trade in sectors with more relationship-speci…c inputs. These results suggest that the Nunn measure of input sophistication and our measure of intermediation may be capturing di¤erent aspects of product contractibility both of which interact with country governance in shaping whether trade occurs within the boundary of the …rm.
Conclusions
The literature on …rms and international trade has focused attention on issues of contracting and the boundaries of the …rm. This research speaks to policy issues surrounding the growth of outsourcing, o¤shoring and international production networks. Our results provide evidence on the role of country governance and product contractibility in determining intra-…rm trade. We …nd evidence of selection: the decision to establish a foreign a¢ liate in a country di¤ers from the choice of how much to source from the a¢ liate once it is established. While a¢ liates are more likely to be situated in countries that are larger and have better governance, once a¢ liates exist, the share of intra-…rm trade is negatively related to both country size and country governance quality.
Our …ndings both complement and extend the existing empirical literature on intra…rm trade. Our results con…rm the role of industry capital intensity and country capital abundance in in ‡uencing intra-…rm trade. Our results also point to the role of other interactions between country and product characteristics and their interactions. Note: Column (1) repeats the results from column (2) in Table 5 . In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from each variable entering the interaction term, so that the main effects of each variable can be interpreted as the effect at the sample mean. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC level are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Note: Column (1) replicates the baseline results from column (4) in Table 5 . In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from each variable entering the interaction term, so that the main effects of each variable can be interpreted as the effect at the sample mean. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC level are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. $1,000,000 $10,000,000 $100,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $10,000,000,000
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